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Unchecked Monopolies: The Questionable Constitutionality of
Design Patent and Product Design Trade Dress Overlap in Light
of Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.
by Ellie B. Atkins
Introduction
Last summer, Samsung suffered a large blow
in what has now been dubbed by the media as the
“Smartphone Wars” when Apple received a $1.05
billion dollar jury award after suing Samsung for patent
and trade dress infringement.1 The policy underlying
intellectual property law reflects a tension between
incentivizing invention by protecting creators’ rights
and maximizing the public benefit. This balance
was clearly at the heart of the now notorious Apple v.
Samsung case, where following the large jury award
for Apple, the parties quickly issued public statements
expressing opposing sentiments.2 Apple characterized
the win as a victory for inventors’ rights:
The lawsuits . . . were about
much more than patents or
money. They were about
values. At Apple, we value
originality and innovation and
pour our lives into making
the best products on earth.
We make these products to
delight our customers, not for
our competitors to flagrantly
copy. We applaud the court for
. . . sending a loud and clear
message that stealing isn’t
right.3
Samsung, however, emphasized the alternative side
of the tension, saying, “Today’s verdict should not
be viewed as a win for Apple, but as a loss for the
American consumer.”4
1. See Agustino Fontevecchia, Smartphone Wars: Who
Wins And Who Loses From The Apple-Samsung Patent Ruling,
Forbes (last visited Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
afontevecchia/2012/08/27/smartphone-wars-who-wins-and-wholoses-from-the-apple-samsung-patent-ruling/.
2. Brian X. Chen, Apple Beats Samsung: First Reactions,
NY Times Blog: Bits (last visited Mar. 11, 2013), http://bits.blogs.
nytimes.com/2012/08/24/samsung-apple-reactions/.
3. Chen, supra note 2.
4. Bryan Bishop, Samsung: Today’s Verdict ‘a Loss for the
American Consumer’, The Verge (last visited Apr. 11, 2013), http://
www.theverge.com/2012/8/24/3266653/samsung-todays-apple-

As intellectual property law continues to
evolve, the underlying policy goals endure unchanged.
This recent case highlights the economic importance of
intellectual property law5 and serves as an example of
a rights holder seeking to maximize his protection by
obtaining overlapping rights. In fact, Apple obtained
both design patent protection and trade dress protection
for the iPhone and iPad, the products at the heart of
this dispute.6 In light of the high financial stakes,7 it is
important that courts remain diligently committed to
preserving the balance between benefitting the public
and incentivizing innovation. However, in a 2008
decision, the Federal Circuit shifted the balance of
intellectual property rights, blending design patent and
trade dress in a way this Comment argues is potentially
unconstitutional.8
Conflating these two intellectual property
rights tilts the underlying balance strongly in favor
of the inventor or rights holder. Design patents
are constitutionally granted for a limited amount
of time,9 whereas trade dress protection exists

trial-statement-loss-american-consumer.
5. The jury awarded Apple $1.05 billion for Samsung’s
infringement. See Connie Guglielmo, Apple Wins Over Jury in
Samsung Patent Dispute, Awarded $1.05 Billion in Damages,
Forbes (last visited Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
connieguglielmo/2012/08/24/jury-has-reached-verdict-in-applesamsung-patent-suit-court-to-announce-it-shortly/.
6. Apple obtained registered trade dress for the iPhone
design, but also asserted unregistered trade dress protection in
this case. See Nilay Patel, Apple vs. Samsung: inside a jury’s
nightmare, The Verge (last visited Apr. 11, 2013), www.theverge.
com/2012/8/23/3260463/apple-samsung-jury-verdict-formnightmare.
7. Part of the $1.05 billion award in the Apple v. Samsung
case was attributable to trade dress infringement and design patent
infringement. See Guglielmo, supra note 5; see also Debra Cassens
Weiss, Adidas Award of $305M in Trademark Infringement Case
May be Record, ABA Journal News (last visited Mar. 11, 2013),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/adidas_award_of_305m_
in_trademark_infringement_case_may_be_record/ ($305 million
jury award for trademark infringement).
8. See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc. 543 F.3d 665
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (abridging the previous design patent infringement
test and establishing the ordinary observer test as the sole analysis
for design patent infringement).
9. See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have
power to . . . promote the progress of science and useful arts by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries.”).
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potentially indefinitely.10 Considered an important
case for clarifying the design patent infringement
test, Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.,11 also,
perhaps inadvertently, tore down a wall separating
product design trade dress protection from design
patents when it abridged the previous design patent
infringement test and adopted a test remarkably
similar to the infringement test for trade dress. Courts
repeatedly stated prior to Egyptian Goddess that
parties may pursue trade dress protection for a product
design already protected by a design patent because
they considered the two protections separate and
distinct bodies of law granting independent rights.12
However, following the Egyptian Goddess decision,
the rights grew alarmingly close, theoretically allowing
for parties to undermine the policy considerations
supporting these legal doctrines.13 The potential for
abuse is specifically concerning for product design
trade dress, which requires a showing of secondary
meaning14 a burden much lessened by the existence of
a design patent granting monopolized use for fourteen
years.15
This Comment will argue that the rationale
10. See Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp.
595, 605 (1996) (explaining that trademarks’ indefinite protection
depends on the strength and duration of the public’s recognition
of the mark); see also 1 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition § 8:1 (4th ed.) (noting trade dress receives the same
protection as trademarks under the Lanham Act).
11. 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
12. See W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir.
1985) (citing their separate infringement tests as justification for
the allowance of trade dress and design patent overlap); Application
of Mogen David Wine Corp., 140 U.S.P.Q. 575, 549 (1964) (“In
our opinion, trademark rights, or rights under the law of unfair
competition, which happen to continue beyond the expiration of
a design patent, do not ‘extend’ the patent monopoly. They exist
independently of it, under different law and for different reasons.”).
13. The potential overlap of design patent and trade
dress protection could provide an extended patent monopoly.
Justification for the patent law monopoly is that the right is timelimited. However, as the rights begin to merge closer together it is
more difficult to condone allowing a design patent holder to obtain
indefinite trade dress protection for the same ornamental design
subject of a design patent. See Krueger Int’l, Inc., 915 F. Supp.
at 604-05 (stating the policy goals of patent law are to encourage
invention by providing a limited monopoly whereas the goals of
trademark law are to prevent consumer confusion as to the source
of the goods).
14. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529
U.S. 205 (2000) (deciding that product design trade dress requires
secondary meaning to establish the distinctiveness necessary for
trade dress protection).
15. See Winning Ways, Inc. v. Holloway Sportswear, Inc.,
903 F. Supp. 1457, 1460-61 (D. Kan. 1995) (“Granting trade dress
protection to an item for which a patent has expired creates tension
because the product may have obtained secondary meaning or
inherent distinctiveness precisely because the product was patented.
If so, the trade dress protection does not have an independent basis
and effectively extends the monopoly granted by the patent.”).
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for allowing trade dress protection proceeding from
an expired or current design patent is erroneous in
light of the Egyptian Goddess test for design patent
infringement. In focusing on the infringement test,
it will assess whether trade dress (particularly for
product design) and design patents are actually distinct,
independent legal doctrines. This Comment will
conclude that courts should hold parties seeking trade
dress protection for product design where they already
have a design patent to a higher standard, in line with
the Supreme Court’s goals in Wal-Mart Stores Inc., v.
Samara Brothers, Inc.16
Part I will discuss the history of design
patent and trade dress protection. Specifically, it
will assess the history of the infringement tests for
each intellectual property doctrine and the rationales
underlying the infringement tests. Furthermore, it will
evaluate case law before and after Egyptian Goddess
to compare courts’ design patent infringement analysis.
It will also review case law prior to Egyptian Goddess
that assessed the coexistence of design patent and trade
dress to further examine courts’ varying rationales.
Part II will assess whether design patents and product
design trade dress are really distinct, independent legal
doctrines. Assessing the substantial shift caused by
Egyptian Goddess, the Comment will argue that courts’
previous reasoning for allowing design patent and trade
dress overlap—that the legal regimes are separate and
distinct—is now erroneous because the two protections
have been rendered nearly identical over time. By
analyzing potential situations in which this may allow
for extended protection, this Comment will discuss the
potential unconstitutionality of this protective overlap
and its opposition to patent and trademark policy. In
conclusion, this Comment will recommend a more
stringent standard for product design trade dress where
the design was previously, or is currently, protected
by a design patent to ensure these legal doctrines do,
in fact, remain independent and distinct. Specifically,
requiring strong proof of distinctiveness for secondary
meaning may provide the necessary safeguard from
unchecked design monopolies.

16. See Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. at 212 (recognizing that
trade dress for product design, like a color, does not immediately
serve a source-defining function in the minds of consumers, and
thus, since it is not inherently distinctive, should require secondary
meaning to establish distinctiveness before trade dress protection
attaches).
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I.

Background

A.
		

The History and Basic Principles
of Patent Law

Patent law authority is derived from the
Constitution.17 The Constitution provides, in what
is commonly referred to as the Intellectual Property
Clause, “Congress shall have power to . . . promote
the progress of science and useful arts by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries.”18
This clause provides the constitutional authority for
patent rights, laying out the framework for providing
a time-limited monopoly in an effort to incentivize
invention.19 Patents are a negative right in that they
require no positive action be taken by a patent holder
and provide only for the right to exclude others from
using or selling a patented invention.20 Patent law has
three central purposes: first, to encourage and reward
invention; second, to disclose inventions; and, third,
to protect the public domain by maintaining stringent
patentability requirements.21
B.	Design Patents
There are two types of patents: utility patents
for functional inventions and design patents for
ornamental designs. Protection for design patents
was codified in 1842 to fill a gap that existed between
copyright and patent law.22 There are fundamental
differences between utility and design patents, most
17. See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
18. Id.
19. See Wilcox & Gibbs Sewing-Mach. Co. v. Gibbens Frame,
17 F. 623, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1883) (explaining that patent law provides
a benefit to both the inventor and the public because the inventor
is given a limited monopoly and the public benefits from the
invention’s disclosure).
20. See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210
U.S. 405, 425 (1908) (describing the patent right as the “right to
exclude”).
21. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262
(1979).
22. See Susan Scafidi et al., Panel II: The Global Contours of
IP Protection for Trade Dress, Industrial Design, Applied Art, and
Product Configuration, 20 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent.
L.J. 783, 787 (2010) (explaining that design patents do not have
a functionality component like utility patents because they were
created to “fill the gap between copyright and patent protection”),
see also Dennis D. Crouch, A Trademark Justification for Design
Patent Rights, 24 Harv. J.L. & Tech. (2010) (manuscript at 41),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1656590 (recounting the
Commissioner of Patents’ remarks in support of the Patent Act of
1902 when he testified that the role of design patents would be as
a “gap-fill[er]” for the space between utility patents and copyright
law).

notably the functionality requirement and the length
of protection.23 Utility patents last for twenty years
beginning on the application filing date, whereas
the term for a design patent is only fifteen years.24
Moreover, functionality is a requirement for the
issuance of a utility patent, but it is not a requirement
for a design patent.25
Previously, design patents were routinely
mischaracterized and underutilized.26 However,
throughout the past decade, design patenting has
experienced rapid growth.27 Some of the growth
correlates to the creation of the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit in 1982, a court established to
unify and strengthen the patent system.28 However,
other design patent growth spikes correlate with recent
landmark trade dress cases such as Samara Bros. and
TrafFix, cases that resulted in more stringent trade
dress requirements and thereby made design patents
more appealing.29 Additionally, the recent Egyptian
23. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 171, 173 (2011), amended by Patent Law
Treaties Implementation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-211, 126
Stat. 1527.
24. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2011) (dictating the term
length for a utility patent), with 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2011) amended by
Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112211, 126 Stat. 1527 (dictating the term length for a design patent);
see also Jeff John Roberts, From Ipads to Crocs, New Patent Law
Protects Design, Bloomberg Businessweek (Dec. 28, 2012), www.
businessweek.com/articles/2012-12-28/from-ipads-to-crocs-newpatent-law-protects-design#p1 (discussing the recently-signed
Patent Law Treaties Implantation Act of 2012, which changed
the design patent term from fourteen years to fifteen years, and
speculating that the United States Patent and Trademark Office
should expect a dramatic rise in design patent applications as a
result of the new law).
25. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2011), with 35 U.S.C. §
171 (2011); see also Crouch, supra note 22 (manuscript at 9)
n. 36 (noting that the requirements for a utility patent are that
the invention be new, useful, and classifiable into one of four
categories, whereas the requirements for a design patent are that
it be new, original, ornamental, and a design for an article of
manufacture).
26. See Scott D. Locke, Fifth Avenue and the Patent Lawyer:
Strategies for Using Design Patents to Increase the Value of
Fashion and Luxury Goods Companies, 5 J. Marshall Rev. Intell.
Prop. L. 40, 53 (2005) (acknowledging that some refer to design
patents as “soft or minor patents”).
27. See Crouch, supra note 22 (manuscript at 16-20)
(documenting the dramatic increase in design patents over
the course of the last decade); see also Roberts, supra note 24
(predicting that design patents will become even more popular as a
result of the newly-signed Patent Law Treaties Imlantation Act of
2012).
28. See Id. (manuscript at 17-18).
29. See id. (suggesting that the these cases resulted in stricter
requirements for trade dress protection because the Samara
Bros., Inc. holding required that trade dress for product design
obtain secondary meaning before protection attaches, and the
court in Traffix stated that there should be a strong presumption
of functionality where a utility patent previously existed, which
created a strong hurdle for those seeking trade dress protection on a
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Goddess case may explain some of the latest design
patent popularity.30 Recently decided in 2008, this case
simplified the design patent infringement test, lessening
the burden for rights holders to prove design patent
infringement.31
The process of obtaining a design patent can
be much faster than that of other intellectual property
rights. In comparison to trade dress, obtaining a
design patent, a process referred to as “prosecution,”
is a much simpler and faster process.32 Whereas trade
dress protection for product design requires secondary
meaning before protection attaches, design patents can
be issued even before the product is used in commerce
or known to the consumer.33
Prior to Egyptian Goddess, courts used a
test for evaluating design patent infringement that
consisted of two steps.34 First, courts employed the
ordinary observer test, which assessed whether an
ordinary observer would be deceived by the allegedly
infringing design into thinking it was the patented
object.35 Second, courts applied the point of novelty
test, which required that the allegedly infringing
device incorporated the same point of novelty as
the patented device.36 Novelty is a requirement for
feature previously covered by a utility patent).
30. See Bruce A. Kugler & Craig W. Mueller, A Fresh
Perspective on Design Patents, 38-Jul Colo. Law. 71 (2009)
(suggesting there will be a surge in design patents after the Egyptian
Goddess decision).
31. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 668
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
32. See Crouch, supra note 22, (manuscript at 18-19) (noting
that the design patent issueance rate is more than ninety percent and
suggesting that this rate results from the fact that design patents are
not closely scruitnized by the patent examiners). Design patents
issue much faster than trade dress, particularly trade dress for
product design, which requires secondary meaning before any rights
attach. Compare Id. (manuscript at 20) (calculating that nearly half
of the design patents issued in 2009 were under review for less than
a year), with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S.
205, 211 (2000) (establishing product design trade dress requires
secondary meaning to establish the distinctiveness necessary for
trade dress protection). See also Roberts, supra note 24 (quoting
a lawyer who stated he believes the prosecution process for design
patents is relataively easy and has obtained a design patent in
approximately sixty days).
33. See Crouch, supra note 22, (manuscript at 23-24)
(explaining Apple’s multi-layered protection approach, which
included a design patent application filed weeks before its public
release date, followed by trademark registration for the same
design).
34. See generally Egyptian Goddess, Inc., 543 F.3d 665
(discussing the merits of the second step of design patent
infringement, namely, the point of novelty test).
35. See Egyptian Goddess, Inc., 543 F.3d at 670 (explaining
the history of the ordinary observer test, which originated from
Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511 (1871)).
36. See id. (crediting Litton Systems, Inc. v. Whirlpool
Corp., 728 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984), as the creator of the point
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design patentability.37 A design is considered novel
if an ordinary observer would consider the design to
be different from prior designs, rather than a mere
modification of an existing design, when viewing the
design as a whole.38
Egyptian Goddess eliminated the second
step, taking issue with the applicability of the point
of novelty test.39 The court reasoned that the point
of novelty test required exaggerated emphasis on
small, often inconsequential, differences between
the patented and accused products, thereby assigning
undue importance to a feature simply because it could
be characterized as novel.40 In this landmark case,
Egyptian Goddess sued Swisa, Inc. for design patent
infringement of its nail buffer.41 Egyptian Goddess’
nail buffer consisted of a rectangular hollow tube with
a square cross-section that featured buffer surfaces
on three of its four sides.42 Swisa’s product was a
rectangular, hollow tube with a square cross-section,
but it had buffer surfaces on all four sides.43 In finding
no infringement and ruling for Swisa, the Federal
Circuit said “no reasonable fact-finder could find that
EGI met its burden of showing, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that an ordinary observer, taking
into account the prior art, would believe the accused
design to be the same as the patented design.”44 The
Federal Circuit stressed in its decision that an ordinary
observer with knowledge of the relevant prior art
is well-equipped to determine whether two designs
are substantially similar. Thus, the court argued,
adopting the Ordinary Observer test as the sole test for
infringement better achieves the original goals of the
Point of Novelty Test and avoids the Point of Novelty
of novelty test because it held that proof of similarity under the
ordinary observer test was not enough to prove design patent
infringement).
37. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 171 (stating a design must be “new” to
be patentable).
38. See generally Sarah Burstein, Visual Invention, 16 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 169 (2012).
39. Egyptian Goddess, Inc., 543 F.3d at 671-78 (discussing
potential problems with the point of novelty test including that it is
difficult to apply where there are multiple point of novelty).
40. See id. at 677 (taking issue with the point of novelty
serving as an excuse for potential design patent infringers).
41. See id. at 682-83. However, after establishing the new
test, the Court did not remand to the lower court, instead analyzing
the case itself. Ultimately, it found the relevant consumer was
unlikely to be deceived by the allegedly infringing device. See
Perry J. Saidman, Egyptian Goddess Exposed! But Not in the
Buff(er) . . ., 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 859, 880-87
(2008) (arguing the Federal Circuit misapplied the test to the facts
of this case).
42. See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 668.
43. See id.
44. Id. at 682.
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Test pitfalls.45

Unlike patent and copyright law, trademark
law does not derive its authority from the Intellectual
Property clause of the Constitution.46 Instead,
trademark law is grounded in the Lanham Act,47 which
draws its constitutional authority from the Commerce
Clause.48 The primary goal of trademark law is to
prevent consumer confusion as to the source of goods
and to protect companies’ good will.49 This doctrine
of law strives to ensure that companies are able to
properly distinguish their goods from others so that
consumers may easily ascertain the source of goods
they see in commerce.50
A trademark must be distinctive to receive
Lanham Act protection, and distinctiveness may
be acquired either inherently or through secondary
meaning.51 Distinctiveness is assessed on a sliding
scale ranging from generic terms to arbitrary or fanciful
words.52 Generic marks are not granted any protection,
whereas an arbitrary or fanciful mark receives
automatic protection upon its use in commerce.53
Between these two ends of the spectrum are descriptive
terms and suggestive terms.54 Suggestive terms,
like arbitrary or fanciful terms, are considered to be

inherently distinctive and thus trademark protection
is granted automatically upon the product’s use in
commerce.55 However, merely descriptive terms
require an additional showing of secondary meaning
(or five years use in commerce) before trademark
protection attaches.56 Secondary meaning requires that,
in the minds of the public, the primary significance of
the mark is to identify the source of the product rather
than the product itself.57 This does not necessarily
mean that the consumer must know which specific
source the goods come from, only that the consumer
must know it comes from a single, albeit often
unknown, source.58 In analyzing secondary meaning,
courts look to a non-exhaustive list of factors, none of
which are alone determinative, including advertising
costs, consumer studies, media coverage, amount of
sales, and length and exclusivity of the trade dress
use.59
Additionally, trademark law restricts
protection to those marks that are not functional.60 The
functionality doctrine forbids a producer to control a
useful product feature, which would inhibit legitimate
competition, in adherence to the overarching goals of
trademark law of protecting the consumer by promoting
competition and protecting companies’ reputations.61 A
product feature is considered functional if it is essential
to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the
cost or quality of the article and would put competitors

45. See id. at 677-78 (reasoning that an ordinary observer
would be naturally drawn to the differences between the claimed
and accused designs that render them distinct from prior art).
46. Trademark Law is derived from the Lanham Act 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1141(n).
47. Id.
48. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
49. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,
767-68 (1992) (describing the purposes of the Lanham Act as
preventing deception and protecting against unfair competition).
50. See id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 in discussing eligibility of
marks only if they serve source-identifying purposes).
51. See id. at 768 (setting forth the “general rule” that
trademarks may achieve distinctiveness either inherently or by
acquisition); see also Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World,
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (setting fourth the four categories
of distinctiveness).
52. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9 (“Arrayed
in an ascending order which roughly reflects their eligibility to
trademark status and the degree of protection accorded, these
classes are (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4)
arbitrary or fanciful.”).
53. See id. (explaining that a mark may become cancelled at
any point if it becomes generic, a burden no secondary meaning
can overcome because it would put competitors at an unfair
disadvantage).
54. See id. (clarifying that descriptive words may obtain
protection upon a showing of secondary meaning, but that
suggestive words do not).

55. See id. (explaining suggestive marks were created to fill
the large void between merely descriptive and arbitrary marks).
56. See id. at 10 (suggesting that the five year exception was
created so as not to deprive the mark owner who has put forth
substantial effort and money into creating good will and brand
recognition).
57. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159,
163 (1995) (assessing secondary meaning in determining whether a
color can achieve trademark protection (citing Inwood Laboratories,
Inc. v. Ives laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851, n. 11 (1982))).
58. See McCarthy, supra note 10, § 3:1 (stating that the
purpose of trademarks is to distinguish the source of one seller’s
goods from another source’s goods).
59. See Topps Co. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8556, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (weighing factors such as
Topps’ advertising, sales success, and extended exclusive use in
the United States to determine that the Ring Pop trade dress has
achieved secondary meaning).
60. See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 165 (“The functionality
doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote
competition by protecting a firm’s reputation, from instead
inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control
a useful product feature.”).
61. See Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale, Inc., 915 F.
Supp. 595, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“the doctrine serves to promote
competition by protecting advances in functional design from being
monopolized and encouraging the broadest dissemination of useful
design features.” (quoting Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d
327, 331 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See
also McCarthy, supra note 10, § 7:26[3][b].

C.
		

History and Basic Principles of 		
Trademark Law
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at a significant, non-reputation related disadvantage.62
D.

Trade Dress

The Lanham Act also protects trade dress,
which is either the product packaging of a good or the
product design or configuration, so long as it serves a
source-identifying function.63 Trade dress protection
can protect the product itself, the design of the product,
the package design, or even “features such as size,
shape, color or color combinations, texture, [or]
graphics.”64
The Supreme Court created separate
distinctiveness rules for product packaging and product
design in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers,
Inc.65 In this trade dress infringement case, Samara
Brothers, Inc. sued when Wal-Mart intentionally
began selling direct replicas of Samara Brothers baby
clothes.66 Following Supreme Court precedent in Taco
Cabana,67 Samara Brothers argued that its marks were
inherently distinctive and thus did not require proof
of secondary meaning.68 The Court required proof
of secondary meaning for Samara Brothers clothing,
while still upholding Taco Cabana, by classifying Taco
Cabana’s trade dress as product packaging and Samara
Brothers’ trade dress as product design.69 Thus, the
Taco Cabana decision came to stand for the premise
that product packaging is inherently distinctive and
does not require proof of secondary meaning, whereas
the Samara Brothers case asserted that product design
is not inherently distinctive, therefore requiring proof
of secondary meaning before trade dress protection
attaches.70
Trade dress infringement is analyzed according
to the same consumer confusion test used for trademark
62. See Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10
(1982).
63. See Krueger Int’l, 915 F. Supp. at 601 (setting forth the
different interpretations of trade dress as either the total image of
the product or particular features).
64. See id. (quoting LeSportsac, Inc. v. KMart Corp., 754 F.2d
71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985)).
65. 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
66. See id. at 207-08 (discussing Wal-Mart’s actions in
sending its designer photographs of plaintiff’s goods and requesting
exact replicas to be sold in Wal-Mart stores).
67. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
68. See Samara Bros., 529 U.S. at 214-15 (dismissing
respondent’s contention that Two Pesos forbids requiring all product
design trade dress to show secondary meaning).
69. See id. (finding the décor in the Taco Cabana restaurant
qualifies as product packaging rather than product design).
70. Once something has proven distinctiveness, the party
seeking trade dress protection must also establish that the mark is
non-functional.

62

infringement.71 Each federal circuit employs their own
version of a multi-factor test for infringement focused
on whether or not the consumer would be confused as
to the source of the goods.72 The federal circuit tests
differ slightly, but generally reflect the same eight
factors: strength of the mark, proximity of the goods,
similarity of the marks, actual confusion, similar
marketing channels, consumer sophistication, bad faith
of the defendant, and quality of the defendant’s goods.73
E.
		
1.

A Brief History of the Relevant 		
Case Law
Courts’ interpretation of design patent
infringement and the focal shift
resulting from Egyptian Goddess

Prior to Egyptian Goddess, courts employed
the two-part infringement test.74 For example, in
Hosley International Trading Corp. v. K Mart Corp.,75
plaintiff Hosley International Trading Corporation
had a design patent for the ornamental design of a
cauldron-shaped votive candleholder, which it claimed
was infringed by the defendant. The court found no
infringement, citing the second prong of the two-part
test, namely that the two designs did not incorporate
the same point of novelty.76 In Metrokane, Inc. v.
Wine Enthusiast,77 Metrokane sued for design patent
infringement concerning its corkscrew opening
device, trademarked and sold under the name “the
Rabbit.”78 The court granted summary judgment for
the defendants, finding design patents inappropriate for
part of the device and a lack of substantial similarity
between the two devices.79
After eliminating the second part of the twopart test in Egyptian Goddess, courts naturally began to
71. See Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. at 766 (applying the
likelihood of confusion test to trade dress infringement).
72. See e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d
492, 493 (2d Cir. 1961); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341
(9th Cir. 1979).
73. See AMF Inc., 599 F.2d at 341 (explaining the multi-factor
test for infringement).
74. See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665,
670 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining the previously used two-part test
that consisted of the ordinary observer test and the point of novelty
test).
75. 237 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
76. See id. at 912-13 (denying plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment after finding that defendant’s accused device did not
incorporate the same ring and raised pattern on the handle that
served as a point of novelty for plaintiff’s device).
77. 185 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
78. Id. at 324.
79. Id. at 327-30.
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focus on ordinary observer confusion in infringement
cases.80 In Huztler Manufacturing Co. v. Bradshaw
International Inc.,81 Huztler sought an injunction
barring the sale of Bradshaw’s products, which Huztler
alleged infringed its design patents for garlic and onion
food-preserving storage containers.82 The court granted
Huztler’s preliminary injunction, finding that the two
products would appear visually very similar to an
ordinary consumer shopping for the product.83
2.

The Supreme Court’s Long-Standing
Skepticism of Overlapping Rights

The Supreme Court has long viewed
overlapping rights, or more specifically rights
stemming from a current or expired patent, with
skepticism.84 For example, in Singer Manufacturing
Co. v. June Manufacturing Co.,85 the plaintiff, Singer,
had many utility patents for its sewing machines, and
upon expiration of those patents, competitors entered
into the field copying the functional aspects of the
machines and calling them Singer sewing machines.86
Singer sued, claiming trademark rights in the name
Singer, and attempted to prevent its competitors from
copying the name and design of Singer machines.87
Although the Court ultimately ruled that the
competitors were barred from using the name Singer
on their goods, it recognized that the competitors
were, however, free to copy the design and form of the
machine:
It is self-evident that on the
expiration of a patent the
monopoly created by it ceases to
exist, and the right to make the
thing formerly covered by the
patent becomes public property.
It is upon this condition that the
patent is granted. It follows, as
80. See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665,
671 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (eliminating the second part test, and thus
shifting the focus to the first prong of the test: confusion amongst
ordinary observers).
81. Hutzler Mfg. Co. v. Bradshaw Int’l, Inc., 11 CIV. 7211
PGG, 2012 WL 3031150 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2012).
82. Id.
83. Id. at *13-15.
84. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
539 U.S. 23 (2003); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S.
225 (1964); Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938);
Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
85. 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
86. Id. at 170.
87. Id.

a matter of course, that on the
termination of the patent there
passes to the public the right to
make the machine in the form
in which it was constructed
during the patent.88
Echoing this same sentiment, the Court in a more
recent case, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,89
wrote “when [a] patent expires, the monopoly created
by it expires, too, and the right to make the article—
including the right to make it in precisely the shape it
carried when patented—passes to the public.”90
In each of these cases, the Court emphasized
its concern with maintaining an equal balance between
the public domain and the benefit to the designer or
inventor. Specifically, the Court addresses its unease
with rights holders exploiting or manipulating various
protections to circumvent the legal intentions of each,
specifically, their limitations.
3.

Lower Courts’ Inconsistent Case Law
Concerning Trade Dress and Design
Patent Overlap

Despite courts’ longstanding reservations
about potential protective overlap, many courts do
allow simultaneous protection, and it is very common
for plaintiffs to obtain multiple forms of intellectual
property protection.91 In 1995, the Southern District
of New York addressed the validity of trade dress
protection for a product feature already protected by a
design patent in Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc.92
Hubbell sued defendants Pass & Seymour and Legrand
for trade dress infringement concerning Hubbell’s
electrical products.93 The defendants, citing Supreme
Court precedent, argued that Hubbell’s expired
design patents for their product precluded trade dress
protection.94 The court rejected this view, reiterating
that trade dress and patent law are separate bodies of
law, with independent policy justifications, different
88. Id. at 185.
89. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
90. Id. at 230.
91. See Crouch, supra note 22 (manuscript at 45) (explaining
that it is not uncommon for patent litigation to also include
allegations of copyright, trade dress, and unfair competition
charges).
92. Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 955,
957-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
93. See id. (discussing Hubbell’s trade dress for its plugs and
connectors).
94. See id. at 959 (stressing the unlawful nature of extending
the patent monopoly).
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sources of authority, and separate infringement tests.95
A year later, the same court in Topps Co.
v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co.96 went a step further in
finding that the existence of an expired design patent
“presumptively indicates that the design at issue is
not de jure functional.”97 In this case, Topps Co.,
creator of the Ring Pop, sued Gerrit J. Verburg Co.
for the defendant’s Diamond Pop, alleging trade
dress infringement.98 After finding that the Ring
Pop had achieved secondary meaning, the court also
addressed the potential functionality of the trade dress,
which if found to be functional would bar trade dress
protection.99 Addressing the expired design patent, the
court echoed its sentiment from Hubbell Inc. in finding
no conflict between trademark and patent overlap, but
also indicated that the existence of a design patent
could prove beneficial to a party seeking trade dress
protection in that it served to show non-functionality.100
Again in 1996 the Southern District of New
York reiterated that “[a] design patent is analytically
distinct from a protectable trade dress, and industrial
products may qualify for both kinds of protection
without violating the policy goals of either patent or
trade dress law.”101 Similar to its decision in Topps,
the court argued trade dress protection does not extend
a design patent monopoly, that when a design patent
expires it becomes copyable, just not “in such a way
95. See id. (comparing the goals of patent law and trademark
law and concluding patent law seeks to further invention whereas
trademark law seeks to protect the consumer from brand or
source confusion); id. at 960 (discussing the history of patent
and trademark coexistence); id. (“The trademark owner has an
indefinite term of protection, it is true, but in an infringement suit
must also prove secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion,
which the owner of a design patent need not do; there is therefore
no necessary inconsistency between the two modes of protection.”
(quoting W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir.
1985)).
96. No. 96 Civ. 7302, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18556 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 13, 1996).
97. See id. at *30.
98. See id. at *1-5 (noting the substantial similarities between
the two products such as the sales method, configuration of the
product, and product packaging).
99. See id. (finding no “particular manufacturing need or
requirement” for the configuration of the Ring Pop design, and
noting that this design was probably more difficult and costly to
manufacture than other available designs).
100. See id. at *29-30 (suggesting that the existence of a
design patent helps parties overcome the burden of showing nonfunctionality in obtaining trade dress protection); see also E.Z.
Bowz, L.L.C. v. Professional Product Research Co., 2003 WL
22068573 No. 00 Civ. 8670 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), at *24 (finding a
design patent to be helpful evidence of non-functionality, and thus
also helpful in establishing trade dress protection).
101. See Krueger Int’l Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp.
595, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (clearing up “common misconceptions”
concerning design patent and trade dress overlap).
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that customers are deceived about what they are
buying.”102
Many years prior to these cases the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals103 (C.C.P.A.) paved the
way for the later decisions in finding no issue with
trade dress protection and design patent overlap.
Twice, in In re Mogen David Wine Corp.104 and In
re Honeywell, Inc.,105 the C.C.P.A. overturned the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (T.T.A.B.) to
find that trade dress does not extend a design patent
monopoly.106 Interestingly, despite the C.C.P.A.’s
previous decision in In re Mogen David Wine Corp.,
the T.T.A.B. again denied registration of a trademark
where a design patent already existed, reasoning it
would undermine patent law policy. Predictably, the
C.C.P.A. reversed, citing its earlier decision.
While the previous cases are representative
of the majority viewpoint,107 some courts do reach
alternative conclusions.108 Notably, in Winning Ways,
Inc. v. Holloway Sportswear Inc., the district court
expressed hesitation about the coexistence of design
patent and trade dress protection, saying,
[g]ranting trade dress protection
to an item for which a patent
has expired creates tension
because the product may have
obtained secondary meaning
or inherent distinctiveness
precisely because the product
was patented. If so, the trade
dress protection does not
102. See id. at 605. (alluding to the trade dress infringement
test, which analyzes consumer confusion).
103. This court was the precursor to the court of appeals
for the federal circuit. See History of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, The Federal Circuit
Historical Society, http://www.federalcircuithistoricalsociety.org/
historyofcourt.html (last visited April. 11, 2013).
104. 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
105. 532 F.2d 180 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
106. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d at 1266; In re
Honeywell, Inc., 532 F.2d at 183.
107. Julia A. Matheson & Stephen L. Peterson, Combine
and Conquer: How the Synthesis of Design Patent and Trade
Dress Achieve Maximum Protection for Your Product Design,
Finnegan (May 2009), http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/
articlesdetail.aspx?news=74f843be-c63a-40cc-8ae0-007bc50fdd99.
108. See Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d
971, 977-78 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Courts must proceed with caution in
assessing claims to unregistered trademark protection in the design
of products so as not to undermine the objectives of the patent laws
. . . . Since trademark protection extends for an unlimited period,
expansive trade dress protection for the design of products would
prevent some functional products from enriching the public
domain.”).
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have an independent basis
and effectively extends the
monopoly granted by the
patent.109
This minority viewpoint indicates some courts remain
suspicious of the potential coexistence of design patent
and trade dress, recognizing the overlap’s potential to
undermine the policy goals of the legal doctrines in
tipping the benefits largely in favor rights holder and
out of the public’s favor.
II.

Analysis

In light of the Egyptian Goddess design patent
infringement test shift, the potential coexistence of
trade dress following the issuance of a design patent
undermines the constitutional grant and policy goals
of patent law.110 Prior to Egyptian Goddess, courts
justifying simultaneous trade dress and design patent
protection reasoned that the two were distinct bodies
of law, evidenced by their separate policy goals
and infringement tests.111 In light of the fact that
trade dress and design patents now adhere to similar
infringement tests, the boundaries of these rights are
also nearly identical.112 The potential for overlap is
most concerning for product design trade dress, which
the Supreme Court ruled in Samara Brothers could
never be inherently distinctive.113 As a result, the Court
109. See Winning Ways, Inc. v. Holloway Sportswear,
Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1457, 1460-61 (D. Kan. 1995) (emphasizing
adherence to the underlying policy goals of patent law in noting that
the public’s access is still restricted where trade dress protection
attaches to a design that should have fallen into the public domain
following the design patent’s expiration).
110. This Comment argues that following Egyptian Goddess,
the infringement tests for design patents and trade dress became
nearly identical, thereby conflating the rights and the protections
associated with them. As such, a rights holder could potentially
obtain both design patent protection and trade dress protection,
which would allow him to extend the patent monopoly right in
substance, but not in name.
111. See, e.g., In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925,
579 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (“In our opinion, trademark rights, or rights
under the law of unfair competition, which happen to continue
beyond the expiration of a design patent, do not “extend” the patent
monopoly. They exist independently of it, under different law and
for different reasons.”).
112. The court in Egyptian Goddess abridged the infringement
test for design patents, eliminating the point of novelty test and
re-focusing infringement on consumer confusion. See Egyptian
Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 671 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
The infringement test for trade dress also hinges on the likelihood
of consumer confusion; AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341
(9th Cir. 1979) (explaining the multi-factor test for infringement).
As such, both legal doctrines protect the rights holder from products
that might deceive a consumer in the marketplace.
113. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529

required that all product design trade dress achieve
secondary meaning before trade dress protection
attaches.114 Allowing trade dress protection where
a design patent already protects the same feature
significantly lessens the burden that the Supreme
Court established in Samara Brothers.115 That burden,
establishing secondary meaning, will be significantly
lessened by the years of monopolized use resulting
from the patent.116
A.

The Egyptian Goddess holding lessens
the burden for rights holders in proving
infringement and further merges design
patents with trade dress.

Prior to Egyptian Goddess, design patent
infringement was not as common as the two-part
test was often a difficult hurdle for patent holders to
overcome.117 Even where a party could show that an
U.S. 205, 214-15 (2000) (distinguishing product design from
product packaging and finding that the former cannot be inherently
distinctive).
114. Id. at 215.
115. See id. at 212-13 (explaining that product design serves
more than just a source-designating function and thus secondary
meaning should be established as a burden to show that it does
in fact serve a source-identifying function before trade dress
protection attaches).
116. Secondary meaning is established when in the minds
of the relevant consumers, the trademark or trade dress comes to
serve a source-identifying function. McCarthy, supra note 10, §
15:1. If potential consumers are prevented from utilizing the same
design patented feature(s), the product design will begin to serve
as a differentiating function for the brand, thus separating it from
the competitors’ products. It will then also more easily become
a source-identifying feature rather than a descriptive feature for
the product because of its unique status as the only product with
that design amongst its competitors. For example, if a particularly
popular salt and pepper shaker was shaped as a penguin, and
the company that sold this product obtained a design patent for
the penguin shape, it could use that design patent to prevent any
competitor from selling a similar good in a similar penguin shaped
design. Thus, consumers will begin to associate the penguin shape
with the source of the good (the company that makes it) and not
as an indicator that the product is a salt and pepper shaker, which
hypothetically may have been the case if competitors were able
to copy the design and the penguin shape became an increasingly
popular shape for salt and pepper shakers. Additionally, the design
patent will give the company fifteen years of production that can
serve as evidence of continued sales, which would help establish
secondary meaning. See McCarthy, supra note 10, § 15:1 (4th
ed.) (stating that evidence of secondary meaning may consist of
direct evidence, in the form of a customer survey, or circumstantial
evidence, in the form of the input of the seller or circumstantial
evidence, which can consist of evidence of sales volume, length
of time used, and the quantity and quality of advertising and
promotion exposing customers to the symbol).
117. See Hosley Int’l Trading Corp. v. K Mart Corp., 237 F.
Supp. 2d 907, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2002) dismissed sub nom. Hosley Int’l
Trading Corp. v. Designco, 79 F. App’x 429 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting
that the case “not surprisingly” turned on whether the two devices
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ordinary observer would be deceived by the allegedly
infringing product, oftentimes the points of novelty
would be different, thus stifling a party’s claim for
infringement. Hosley Intern. Trading Corp. v. K Mart
Corp.118 provides a good example of this exact scenario.
This case concerns a design patent for the ornamental
design of cauldron-shaped votive candleholders, which
plaintiff Hosley International Trading Corporation
alleged was infringed by Designco.119 In defense,
Designco argued that its products do not incorporate
the same two points of novelty as plaintiff’s patent.120
Agreeing with the defense, the court found that the
patentee’s points of novelty were not incorporated by
the defendant, and thus granted Designco’s motion
to dismiss despite finding that the defendant’s design
might deceive an ordinary observer.121
Prior to Egyptian Goddess, courts focused
largely on the actual design patents, rather than
the perspective of the typical consumer, to find
infringement. In Metrokane, Inc. v. Wine Enthusiast,122
a design patent infringement case concerning a leveroperated corkscrew device for opening wine, the court
in finding no infringement reiterated the two-part
infringement test, but placed little emphasis on the
perspective of the relevant consumer.123 Even in its
assessment of the ordinary observer test—the first part
of the infringement test—the court did not address the
point of view of the consumer, instead substituting its
own interpretation of the design patent drawings to
determine the similarity of the goods.124
Following the Egyptian Goddess decision,
courts began to determine infringement according to
consumer deception. Although the Ordinary Observer
Test was utilized before Egyptian Goddess, it received
much greater emphasis afterwards when it became
the sole measurement for infringement. As such,
courts began to place less emphasis on the claims in
the design patents and began to focus on consumer
deception.
In interpreting the Ordinary Observer test,
courts understood the ordinary observer to be a typical
purchaser and accordingly found infringement when
incorporated the same point of novelty).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 908.
120. Id. at 912.
121. Id. at 911-12.
122. 185 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
123. See id.
124. See id. at 330 (analyzing the independent visual features
of the devices one by one and concluding “the overall visual
impressions they create are markedly different” without assessing
how an ordinary purchaser might construe the similarity of the
goods).
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a typical consumer might be confused as to the source
of the goods during a typical shopping experience.125
In Huztler Mfg. Co. v. Bradshaw Int’l Inc.,126 the
court assessed design patent infringement by focusing
on consumer deception instead of the design patent
claims.127 Despite the fact that the similarities of
the ornamental designs are typically assessed by the
design patent drawings, the court assessed consumer
deception in commerce: “Accordingly, the ‘ordinary
observer’ here is someone who has seen, shopped for,
or purchased food storage items of similar design.”128
B.
		
		
		
		

A comparison of the design patent
and trade dress infringement tests
following Egyptian Goddess 		
demonstrates how the two 		
doctrines are now the same.

Patentees were pleased with the Egyptian
Goddess holding because it lessened the burden for
proving infringement.129 While the Federal Circuit’s
concerns in Egyptian Goddess130 were legitimate, its
actions in simply eliminating the second step of the
previous infringement test did not account for the
potential new problems this shift might create.131
The Supreme Court sought to reinstate the
125. See e.g., Hutzler Mfg. Co. v. Bradshaw Int’l, Inc., 11
CIV. 7211 PGG, 2012 WL 3031150, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. July 25,
2012); Minka Lighting, Inc. v. Maxim Lighting Int’l, Inc., No. Civ.
A. 3:06–CV–995–K, 2009 WL 691594, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 16,
2009) (“The ordinary observer is therefore a member of the public
who is currently shopping for or has recently purchased lighting
fixtures—indeed, a ‘purchaser of things of similar design.’”).
126. 11 CIV. 7211 PGG, 2012 WL 3031150 (S.D.N.Y. July 25,
2012).
127. Hutzler, 2012 WL 3031150, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 25,
2012) (“patent infringement can be found for a design that is not
identical to the patented design.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 975 F.2d 815,
820 (Fed. Cir. 1992))); see also id. at *14 (“The Federal Circuit has
made clear that it is error for a trial court to focus on ‘each [design]
element separately instead of analyzing the design as a whole
from the perspective of an ordinary observer.’” (quoting Amini
Innovation Corp. v. Anthony California, Inc., 439 F.3d 1365, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2006))).
128. See Hutzler, 2012 WL 3031150, at *7.
129. Marta Kowalczyk, Design Patent Infringement: PostEgyptian Goddess, 2010 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 239, 253-54
(2010) (arguing that the elimination of the point of novelty test
strengthened design patent holders’ rights because the burden
in infringement cases had been shifted from the plaintiff to the
accused infringer).
130. See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665,
677 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (articulating concerns with the point of novelty
test regarding its potential for abuse by design patent infringers).
131. This Comment suggests that amending the infringement
test also significantly altered the metes and bounds of the design
patent property rights.
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goals articulated in Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White,132
stating that the test for design patent infringement
“must be sameness of appearance, and mere difference
of lines in the drawing or sketch, a greater or smaller
number of lines, or slight variances in configuration,
if sufficient to change the effect upon the eye, will not
destroy the substantial identity.”133 The Court further
explained that the test need not be analyzed from the
viewpoint of an expert.134 In light of this goal, the
court in Egyptian Goddess also looked to see if an
ordinary observer would perceive the two designs
to be substantially the same such as to deceive the
observer into purchasing one over the other. Indeed,
this test has been referred to as similar to the trade
dress infringement test,135 and the words of the new test
explicitly parallel trade dress infringement concerns.136
Both tests focus on a layperson’s opinion.
The design patent infringement test focuses on the
layperson and not an expert because an expert would
be highly unlikely to ever find two objects so similar
as to the point of deception. Similarly, trade dress is
concerned with an ordinary consumer and not an expert
in the field. Moreover, the test seems to be concerned
with an ordinary consumer of the goods, another factor
likening this infringement test to trademark law.137
Indeed, after Egyptian Goddess it appeared that both
trademark infringement and design patent infringement
were most concerned with the possibility of the average
consumer’s likelihood of deception.
C.

Allowing the coexistence of design
patent and trade dress protection
contradicts the Constitutional grant
of authority for intellectual property
protections for a limited time.

Not only is the potential overlap resulting in
132. 81 U.S. 511 (1871).
133. Id. at 526-27.
134. See id. at 527 (suggesting that an expert’s perspective
would never warrant finding infringement because every small
change may seem large to someone well-versed in the field).
135. See Kugler, supra note 30, at 71 (describing the design
patent infringement test post Egyptian Goddess as “somewhat
analogous to a likelihood of confusion test, a concept primarily
related to trademark law”).
136. See Crouch, supra note 22 (manuscript at 30) (“the
minute distinction between design patent distinctiveness and
trade dress distinctiveness may be that a trademark functions to
indicate the source of goods while a design patent focuses on the
appaearance of the goods themeselves. These two . . . are, of
course, largely overlapping.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
137. See Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871)
(emphasizing that the analysis should focus on the principal
purchasers of the goods).

automatic secondary meaning concerning for policy
implications, but it is also contrary to the constitutional
grant of patent authority.138 The Intellectual Property
Clause of the Constitution explicitly states that a patent
will issue only for a “limited time.”139 Trademark
law, which is not bound by the Intellectual Property
clause of the Constitution, may potentially function
indefinitely if the party consistently renews its right and
uses the mark.140
If courts continue to allow coexistence of these
rights, it may allow for an extended patent monopoly.141
Recognizing the similarity of these rights, evidenced
by their nearly identical infringement tests, allowing
trade dress protection following a design patent could
indefinitely extend the same rights and protections
granted by the previous design patent. This potential
extension is contrary to the basic tenants of trademark
law142 and upsets the delicate balance patent law seeks
to preserve by depleting the public domain without any
added benefit to the public as a result.
Concerned with overprotection, the Supreme
Court in Samara Brothers ruled that product design
must always show secondary meaning before trade
dress protection attaches.143 Allowing the overlap
of these rights would undermine the Supreme
Court’s expressed goals in Samara Brothers by
lessening the secondary meaning burden for product
design.144 While secondary meaning does require
some affirmative step(s) to be taken by the rights
holder (such as advertising or sales), fifteen years of
138. The Constitution grants authority of a patent for a
“limited time.” U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
139. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
140. See The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2002) (drawing
its authority from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, it is
not limited by the constitutional mandate that the authority be for a
limited time).
141. Because the trade dress and design patent protection are
arguably nearly identical following Egyptian Goddess, allowing the
overlap of protection would essentially create an extended right.
This rights overlap is particularly troublesome because together
they cancel out each other’s limitations. Trade dress protection
for product design requires that secondary meaning be established
before the protection attaches, a burden much lessened by the
immediate protection a design patent grants. Design patents allow
immediate protection, but they are limited because they only last
for a short period of time. However, trade dress protection could
extend the same right indefinitely.
142. Trademark law is commonly thought of as an extension
of unfair competition law.
143. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,
Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
144. See id. at 212 (explaining that design is like color in
that it cannot be inherently distinctive, and thus requiring product
designs to show they have established a source-identifying function
in the consumers’ eyes before allowing trade dress protection to
attach).
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exclusive use granted by a design patent significantly
decreases that burden, and the steps necessary to
secure secondary meaning become much easier.145
Moreover, a design patent may issue before a good
even is used in commerce and can be obtained much
faster than trade dress protection.146 Thus, assuming,
as this comment argues, that the rights are nearly
identical, the immediate protection granted by a design
patent undermines the benefit to the public and the
free competition—the heart of the Supreme Court’s
concerns in Samara Brothers.147
Some courts have justified overlapping
protection by citing the differences between the
two areas of law.148 For example, the Southern
District of New York repeatedly cited the differences
between design patents and trade dress as rationale
for allowing overlapping rights. In cases pre-dating
Egyptian Goddess, such as Hubbell, the court cited
the differences in the purposes behind each area of
law as reason for allowing overlapping protection.149
However, this rationale would no longer stand in
light of Egyptian Goddess, because the rationales
might remain distinct, but the practical effect of their
protection is nearly identical.
In fact, many courts have even cited the
existence of a design patent as evidence that the trade
dress is not functional, a bar trade dress rights seekers
must overcome before protection attaches.150 Courts
145. See McCarthy, supra note 10, § 15:1 (4th ed. 2003)
(describing secondary meaning as fact-dependent and listing forms
of evidence secondary meaning as customer surveys, evidences of
sales volume, the length of time the mark has been used, and quality
and quantity of advertising).
146. See Crouch, supra note 22, at 20 (calculating that nearly
half of the design patents issued in 2009 were under review for less
than a year).
147. See Samara Bros, 529 U.S. at 215 (predicting that
consumers would be harmed if product design trade dress was
considered always inherently distinctive).
148. See Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc., 883 F. Supp.
955, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (comparing the goals of patent law and
trademark law and concluding that the two are distinct areas of law
because patent seeks to further invention whereas trademark law
seeks to protect the consumer from brand or source confusion); id.
at 960 (“The trademark owner has an indefinite term of protection,
it is true, but in an infringement suit must also prove secondary
meaning and likelihood of confusion, which the owner of a design
patent need not do; there is therefore no necessary inconsistency
between the two modes of protection.” (quoting W.T. Rogers Co. v.
Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1985))).
149. See Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc., 883 F. Supp.
955, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing the differences between the
trade dress and design patent infringement tests as justification for
allowing their overlapping protection).
150. See E-Z Bowz, L.L.C. v. Prof’l Prod. Research Co., No.
00 Civ. 8670, 2003 WL 22068573, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding
a design patent to be helpful evidence of non-functionality, and thus
also helpful in establishing trade dress protection).
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have said that the existence of a design patent helps
to establish that a design on a piece of manufacture is
not functional and that the existence of a design patent
prior to trade dress protection does not upset policy
concerns because upon the expiration of a patent, a
design may be copied so long as it does not confuse a
consumer.151
Interestingly, some courts remained skeptical
of overlapping rights even before Egyptian Goddess.152
Specifically, in Winning Ways, the district court
expressed hesitation about the coexistence of design
patent and trade dress protection.153 In particular, the
court was concerned that secondary meaning may be
achieved only because of the previously issued design
patent.154 Although it remained the minority viewpoint,
this case indicates that some courts remained concerned
about potential overprotection resulting from
overlapping rights.
D.

Addressing the alternative argument:
what is the proper role for design
patents?

Design patents were originally codified to
fill a gap between utility patents and copyright law.155
As a result, some have theorized that the proper role
for design patents is to continue to serve as a legal
gap filler, protecting areas from which trade dress
specifically has reseeded.156 Dennis Crouch has
observed that design patents are well suited to serve
a “bootstrapping” role, specifically as a tool to help
151. See id.; Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915
F. Supp. 595, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that trade dress
infringement requires consumer confusion).
152. See Matheson, supra note 102, at 2; Stormy Clime, Ltd.
v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 977-78 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Courts
must proceed with caution in assessing claims to unregistered
trademark protection in the design of products so as not to
undermine the objectives of the patent laws . . . . Since trademark
protection extends for an unlimited period, expansive trade dress
protection for the design of products would prevent some functional
products from enriching the public domain.”).
153. See generally Winning Ways, Inc. v. Holloway
Sportswear, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1454, 1462 (D. Kan. 1996).
154. See id. at 1460-61; 903 F. Supp. 1457 (“Granting
trade dress protection to an item for which a patent has expired
creates tension because the product may have obtained secondary
meaning or inherent distinctiveness precisely because the product
was patented. If so, the trade dress protection does not have an
independent basis and effectively extends the monopoly granted by
the patent.”); see also supra note 106.
155. See Crouch, supra note 22, at 41 (discussing the “gapfilling” role of design patents).
156. See generally id. (justifying the purpose of design
patents as filling the holes that other intellectual property doctrines,
specifically trademark and trade dress, have left unprotected).
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rights holders secure trade dress protection.157 He
mentions three specific ways the existence of a design
patent alleviates the burden of establishing trade
dress.158 First, he notes that design patents may serve
as evidence of non-functionality.159 The functionality
doctrine is a strict burden all trade dress rights
seekers must overcome.160 A design patent, while not
enough on its own, serves as strong evidence that the
design is not functional.161 Second, the existence of a
design patent facilitates the acquisition of secondary
meaning.162 Exclusive use for fifteen years severely
lessens the burden of establishing secondary meaning,
which requires that consumers view the design
primarily as a source indicator and not as the product
itself.163 Finally, Crouch suggests that a design patent
can protect a design immediately, filling the period of
time that a rights holder would otherwise have to wait
unprotected against copy-cat competitors before trade
dress protection came to fruition.164
Yet, it is precisely these gaps that trade dress
and trademark law must leave open to maintain an
equal benefit to the consumers and the rights holders.
These gaps represent the tradeoffs rights holders give
up to the public domain. Allowing design patents to
fill all of these gaps tips the balance strongly in favor of
rights holders and depletes the public domain.165 This
is injurious to the public and counter to the policy goals
of trademark law.166 Moreover, it is counter to the

Supreme Court’s goals as stated in Samara Brothers.167

157. Id. (manuscript at 38-40).
158. Id. (discussing what he calls design patent
“bootstrapping”).
159. See id. (manuscript at 38-49) (calling this phenonmenon
the “anti-TrafFix doctrine”).
160. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159,
165 (1995) (describing the functionality doctrine as a necessary
feature of trademark law to promote free and open competition).
161. See Topps Co. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., No. 96 Civ.
7302, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18556, at *29-30 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
13, 1996); E.Z. Bowz, L.L.C. v. Prof’l Prod. Research Co., 2003
WL 22068573 No. 00 Civ. 8670 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), at *24. The
requirements for proving functionality, or lack thereof, for a design
patent and trademark or trade dress differ, and thus the existence of
a design patent does not serve as enough evidence in and of itself to
establish nonfunctionality. See Crouch, Supra note 22 (manuscript
at 39) (discussing Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Jaccard Corp., a case in
which the district court allowed trade dress rights to attach to the
same design once protected by a design patent and asserting that a
design patent “simply serves as another piece of evidence to be used
by the jury in determiing non-functionality.”).
162. See Crouch, supra note 22 (manuscript at 40) (explaining
that the existence of a design patent does not alone establish
secondary meaning, but significantly eases the burden).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. The constant goal of intellectual property law is to
maintain a balance between incentivizing invention and protecting
the public.
166. See Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp.

595, 604-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating the goals of trademark law are
to prevent consumer confusion as to the source of the goods).
167. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529
U.S. 205, 213 (2000) (explaining that product design (as compared
to product packaging) is more akin to color in that the “consumer
predisposition to equate the feature with the source does not exist . .
. even the most unusual of product designs-such as a cocktail shaker
shaped like a penguin-is intended not to identify the source, but to
render the product itself more useful or more appealing”). But see
Crouch, supra note 22 (manuscript at 6) (suggesting that Samara
Brothers narrowed trade dress protection precisely because of the
availability of design patent protection).
168. See Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532
U.S. 23, 25-26 (2001).
169. See id. (explaining the successful, wind-resistent twospring device was also a visible feature of the signs).
170. See id. (discussing that defendant not only deliberately
waited for the utility patent to expire so that he could copy the
plaintiff’s sign features, but also similarly named his company).
171. See id. at 26-27 (reviewing procedural posture whereby
the district court found no evidence of secondary meaning and
alternatively that the device was functional).
172. See id.
173. See id. at 30 (describing disproving functionality as
a “heavy burden” that can be dispelled by showing the feature
is “merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the
device”).
174. See E.Z. Bowz, L.L.C. v. Prof’l Prod. Research Co., 2003
WL 22068573 No. 00 Civ. 8670 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), at *24 (noting
that a design patent is helpful evidence of non-functionality).

E.
Trade dress protection where there is a
		
utility patent: the TrafFix 		
		interpretation
Although the Supreme Court has not
yet addressed the effect of an expired design patent on
the issuance of trade dress protection, it has analyzed
the effect of an expired utility patent. In Traffix
Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,168 defendant
Marketing Displays began copying plaintiff’s twospring sign feature, which was created to keep the
sign standing despite strong wind.169 Traffix Devices,
Inc. had obtained a utility patent for this feature, and
upon the patent’s expiration Marketing Displays, Inc.
began copying the device.170 Traffix Devices, Inc.
sued for trade dress protection, arguing its product had
achieved the necessary secondary meaning.171 The
Court held that the existence of utility patent creates a
strong presumption that a design is functional and thus
ineligible for trade dress protection.172 However, the
Court was careful to state that the existence of a utility
patent is not necessarily determinative of functionality,
but a big aspect for a court to consider.173
Conversely, many courts have interpreted the
existence of a design patent as evidence that the design
seeking trade dress protection is not functional.174
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However, the existence of a design patent on the
same subject matter for which trade dress protection
is sought should also trigger courts to examine with
great scrutiny whether overlapping rights would be
constitutional.
F.
		
		

Readjusting courts’ interpretations of
overlapping rights: a recommendation
for moving forward

The Supreme Court’s decisions in Egyptian
Goddess and Samara Brothers should cause courts to
reconsider so easily granting trade dress protection
where a design patent currently, or previously,
existed.175 Of course, the existence of a design patent
may still be helpful in determining non-functionality,
but the burden of showing secondary meaning should
remain stringent.
As it stands currently, a design patent provides
fifteen years of exclusive use.176 Moreover, design
patent prosecution is a much easier and faster process
than the steps necessary for obtaining trade dress
protection.177 As such, a party seeking the strongest
protection for a design can obtain a design patent
before that design is used in commerce, use the fifteen
years (or less) granted by the patent as an aid in
establishing secondary meaning, and then when either
seeking to register the trade dress or assert unregistered
trade dress rights, use the design patent as existence of
non-functionality.178
The Egyptian Goddess infringement test
shift lessened the burden on design patent holders
for proving infringement.179 However, it also greatly
altered the metes and bounds of the patent property
right. As it now stands, according to the current
infringement test, a design patent and trade dress
protection offer nearly identical protective rights.180
175. See discussion infra concerning how a design patent can
be used as a useful tool in establishing trade dress protection.
176. 35 U.S.C. § 173.
177. See Crouch, supra note 22 (manuscript at 18-21)
(discussing the rapidity at which design patents are issued and the
available means for speeding up the process).
178. See id. (manuscript at 38-40) (disccusing what he calls
“bootstrapping,” or the process whereby a rights owner uses a
design patent to fill the holes not protected by trade dress and as a
tool in establishing distinctiveness and nonfunctionality).
179. See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (abridging the previous design patent infringement
test by eliminating the second step and establishing the ordinary
observer test as the sole analysis for design patent infringement).
180. See Crouch, supra note 22 (manuscript at 3) (“Both
regimes focus on the visual appearance of a product or its
packaging and both regimes allow the rights-holder to exclude
others from uses that lead to customer confusion.”).
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Allowing design patents to fill the holes left open by
trade dress thus only further blurs design patent and
trade dress protection.
In line with the Supreme Courts goals in
Samara Brothers—to enhance the standard required for
trade dress protection—courts should not allow parties
to use a design patent as an easy road to showing
secondary meaning.181 Certainly the party seeking
trade dress protection will still carry the burden of
using the good in commerce and marketing the good;
however, the burden of achieving secondary meaning
will certainly be lessened by fifteen years of exclusive
use. Following the Court’s rationale in TrafFix, this
Comment urges courts to view the existence of a
current or expired design patent as strong evidence that
the design is not distinctive. The Court ruled in TrafFix
that the existence of a utility patent would trigger a
presumption that the trade dress was functional.182
Similarly, the existence of a design patent should be
trigger the presumption that the mark is not distinctive.
Of course, for product design trade dress the mark
already requires secondary meaning to acquire the
distinctiveness necessary for trade dress protection.183
The existence of a design patent in this situation would
therefore trigger a stronger showing of secondary
meaning. Courts should view the design patent as a
sign that the rights seeker’s path to secondary meaning
was significantly lessened by the patent monopoly, and
thus courts should require that the secondary meaning
necessary for distinctiveness be more persuasive than
would be necessary otherwise.
Conclusion
The concerns of overlapping rights and
extended monopolies have real and tangible effects
on the marketplace and competition. The headline
grabbing cases such as Apple v. Samsung help remind
courts and the public of the costs, both financially and
to the free marketplace, of loose regulations and casual
scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has long regarded
overlapping rights with skepticism. This suspicion
181. The Supreme Court in Samara Brothers recognized that
product design for trade dress does not inherently serve a sourceidentifying function. Thus, it requires a showing of acquired
distinctiveness (secondary meaning) before trade dress protection
can attach. Fifteen years of exclusive use, granted by a design
patent, would severely lessen, if not nearly eradicate, the burden the
Supreme Court sought to establish in Samara Brothers.
182. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532
U.S. 23, 31 (2001).
183. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S.
205, 216 (2000).
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is necessary to ensure that the intellectual property
rights remained balanced. The underlying policy goals
require that the greatest benefit possible be bestowed to
both the public and the inventors, to incentivize and to
ensure society profits as a result.
This is no different in the case of overlapping
trade dress protection and design patents. Although
previously courts were able to justify overlapping
rights by citing the distinct differences between these
two protective rights, they have since merged in a
way that allowing overlapping rights without further
scrutiny could result in prolonged, unconstitutional
monopolistic use. The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in Egyptian Goddess altered the infringement
test for design patents and in so doing, also altered the
defined property rights associated with design patents.
As such, the infringement test and the protective rights
of design patents are now nearly identical to those of
trade dress. Allowing design patents to serve as useful
aids in establishing trade dress undermines the stated
goals of trade dress protection. The protective gaps left
by trade dress protection are not due to congressional
or judicial oversight, but are a result of careful
consideration and recognition of the delicate balance
intellectual property law seeks to maintain. The
protective holes are space that is dedicated to the public
domain. If design patents are able to fill those gaps, the
public domain—and public—suffers as a result.
Consequently, courts must be careful in their
consideration of trade dress and design patents for
identical subject matter. Moreover, the United States
Patent and Trademark Office should also remain
diligent when assessing the registration of trade dress
for subject matter already protected, or previously
protected, by a design patent. The consequences
of not doing so may have severe anti-competitive
effects. Large companies such as Apple and Nike
consistently seek to bolster their intellectual property
protective measures, and in allowing this overlap, their
competitors are put at a severe disadvantage.
In line with the Court’s decisions in TrafFix
and Samara Brothers, the existence of a design patent
should trigger a presumption that the trade dress is not
distinctive. In the case where the party seeks trade
dress protection for product design, which already
requires secondary meaning (acquired distinctiveness),
the burden on the rights seeking party should be
stronger than it would be otherwise to prove that the
public views the trade dress as an indication of source.
Bearing in mind this recommendation, courts
can continue to evaluate, and allow, some overlapping
rights. It is commonplace for one product to be

protected by multiple facets of intellectual property
law. However, in light of the recent shift in the
protective boundaries of design patents, it is imperative
that courts remain diligent in preventing rights holders
from extending what the Constitution mandates are
“limited rights.”184

184. U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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